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1. Defining esotericism
In constituting itself as a discipline of the human sciences, esotericism
has faced a not insubstantial problem of definition. What is the domain
of study here? Can it be properly constituted as a delimited field of
analysis? The problem is a pressing one, when even the leading figures
of the discipline such as Antoine Faivre admit that 'esotericism' is
'devoid of any particular sense' and 'shows itself to be expandable,
transparent, and semantically indeterminate'.1 If the term itself resists
definition, how can we base a discipline upon it?
Now the standard account of definition, which we have inherited
virtually intact from Plato and Aristotle, gives us fairly rigorous criteria
of definition. According to this account, there are two ways to define a
tenn and they operate in unison. In the first definitional mode, a tenn is
defined positively, by reference to what the thing being defined actually
is. For both Plato and Aristotle, for example, such 'positive' definition
would capture the essence of the thing defined; it would define its
genus. In the second definitional mode, a term is defined by reference
to what differentiates the thing being defined from what it is not. For
Plato and Aristotle, such 'negative' definition would capture the
essential difference of the thing from the other things in its genus; it
\vould define its species. For Plato, as for Aristotle, the two fonns of
definition are necessary for an adequate or 'true' definition. The
account is thus called definition 'by genus and species'.2
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On the received account, then, in order to define 'esotericism' with
the determinacy required to identify it as a semantic - let alone a
disciplinary - field, we must be able both to specify a quality (or
qualities) that is (are) essentially its own, and to distinguish it from
other fields by reference to such a quality (or qualities). A number of
theorists seem to question whether this is possible in the case of
esotericism. This is turn leads us to question whether it is 'esotericism'
which is at fault here, or our received account of definition, which
demands such rigorous criteria of definition.
Faivre's approach to this problem of definition seems to me to
exemplify the general difficulties that esotericists face in this regard. In
his several introductions to the field, he repeatedly baulks at the claim
to be offering a definition of it at all. He claims that such definition as
he offers will not be determinate in the way standard accounts of
definition demand. He claims of his approach merely that it 'facilitates
a sketch of a possible outline of the border around the field, a border
that is, happily, blurred'.1 Indeed, his approach to the delineation of his
subject is thoroughly Wittgensteinean; he treats it as a 'cluster concept':
The question is not what esotericism would be 'in itself. No doubt
esotericism is not even a domain, in the sense in which one speaks
of the domains of painting, or philosophy, or chemistry. It is, rather,
a form of thought, and the point is to identify its nature, on the basis
of those currents or forms of spirituality which appear to illustrate
it.2
Pursuing this method, Faivre adopts a descriptive, rather than
prescriptive or stipulative, approach to the definition of his subject.
And so, despite his concerns about definition, Faivre is able to identify
a given set of qualities - four in all - that serve as determining criteria
for the term. He is emphatic about the importance of the empirical
method here: an 'abstract' definition of esotericism runs the risk of
'being held hostage to an a priori idea of what it "ought" to be, its
"true" nature.'3 Quite rightly, he wants to avoid philosophical or
1 Faivre and Needleman, op. cit., p. xx.
2 Ibid, p. xi.
3 Ibid, p. xii.
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ideological presuppositions which would inhibit his empirical
exploration of the field. He fears doing violence to the historical data.
The problems of determinate definition are not automatically
overcome by this methodology, however. By opting for the descriptive
rather than prescriptive approach, one merely forestalls the need to
stipulate the grounds for one's definition. One pushes the problem a
step further back, but arrives at the same point when one has to make
concrete determinations as to which particular 'currents or forms of
spirituality' one will assert as illustrative or exemplary. Why is this
current exemplary of esotericism but not that? The grounds one gives
for answering such a question will surely indicate what one takes to be
its 'true' nature. That said, the approach does have the advantage of
being relatively transparent. It is undoubtedly better than a definitional
approach that covertly imports one's presuppositions about esotericism
as if they were simple givens.
It seems to me that much of the difficulty of defining 'esotericism'
can be overcome by recognising precisely how difficult it is to define
any term by the Classical method. Even in the natural sciences,
defmition rarely occurs with the determinacy that the Classical
approach prescribes.1 Indeed, the Classical sources themselves point to
the fact that definition occurs in many more ways than their prescriptive
accounts allow. Ironically, determinate definition is achieved nowhere
in the many dialogues of Plato devoted explicitly to the definition of
their subject (justice, virtue, beauty and so on). Plato's definitions are
invariably offered via an illustrative method.2
Approaching the issue from the other direction, there are
advantages in specifying one's understanding of the term as
definitional. Primary among these arises from the need to stipulate a
positive content to the tenn, rather than defming it merely by relation.
For example, the very act of asserting a positive defmition of
esotericism - that is, of defining esotericism by its own qualities rather
than by virtue of its relation to the exoteric - can bring to light the
Max Black argues that even a basic technical term such as 'science' itself does
not admit of definition upon the Classical method. Max Black, Problems of
Analysis, Ithaca Press, New York, 1954, Chapter 2.
2 On this point, see Raziel Abelson, 'Definition', in Paul Edwards (ed.),
Encyclopaedia ofPhilosophy, Macmillan, New York, 1967.
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presuppositions that so concern Faivre. Primary among these is the
tendency 'sometimes due to ignorance and sometimes to an
inquisitorial spirit' to draw an essential link between esotericism and
religious marginality. 1 For Faivre, esotericism cannot be defined merely
by reference to its relation to dominant religious traditions, nor indeed
as the arcane or secret currents within an otherwise overt religious
domain. Esotericism has it own trajectory within the history of
religions - albeit complex and often difficult to discern - which gives it
its own independent status relative to the exoteric. Indeed, there needs
be some degree of independence if esotericism is to be defined
positively, as an autonomous discipline, as Faivre hopes. The truth of
the Classical account of definition lies in this requirement for
independence.
2. Esotericism and postmodernism as 'discourses of alterity'
While refusing to make it definitional, the theme of the marginality of
the esoteric repeatedly appears in Faivre's descriptions of what gives
the esoteric its singular character. For example, primary among the
qualities he attributes to exotericism is the appeal to correspondences.
The idea here is that, across the visible and invisible universe, there
exists a harmony of resonance that is at once real and symbolic. From
this arises the understanding of the world as a series of signs, to be
decoded for the encrypted meaning that links them across creation - and
so the element of mystery which is so characteristic of esotericism.
From this also arises the reversals of logic which situate esotericism in
such tension with prevailing Western intellectual traditions. For,
instead of the principles of contradiction, excluded middle and linear
causality, esotericism espouses principles of included middle and of
synchronicity.2 No other principles could so clearly distinguish
esotericism from the logic that, since Classical thought, has defmed the
intellectual climate of the West. Platonic dualism, as Friedrich
Nietzsche urged, provides the very foundation for Western thought.
Esotericism may be seen as marginalised precisely because of its
1 Loc. cif.
2 A. Faivre (ed.), Access to Western Esotericism, SUNY Press, Albany, 1994, p. 10.
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rejection of this logic. The difficulties of definition can be traced to the
same source.
This theme of correspondences captures the features of esotericism
that most closely link it to the themes of postmodem philosophy, as
also to the increasingly popular self-styled field of postmodem
theology. A fascinating research project might be devoted to tracing
the influence on contemporary theory of esoteric themes regarding the
intelligibility of the transcendental, the necessity of its harmony with
the immanent, and its accessibility via a worldly hermeneutics. For
example, there seem to be clear resonances between the central esoteric
theme of the universe as a book to be deciphered and the much-
discussed claim of Jacques Derrida that 'there is nothing outside the
text'. 1 There are lines of intellectual descent here which might surely be
mapped. And no doubt, the genealogy would be traced through the
writings of Nietzsche, whose importance for contemporary philosophy
and theology can hardly be overestimated. No other modem Western
philosopher has gone further in the attempt to reconcile transcendence
and immanence.
The inverse relation also holds: the themes of postmodemism could
be used to illuminate aspects of esotericism. To take one clear
example, in trying to characterise the influence of esotericism on
exoteric culture, it is often tempting to appeal to the notion of the
cultural unconscious that has been employed so successfully across the
textual studies. Sigmund Freud's term has been adapted by the French
philosopher Jacques Lacan and by the poststructuralists influenced by
him to describe the process whereby cultures, and not merely
individuals, store concepts that they have not ... or for whatever reason
cannot - fully assimilate at an ordered, conscious leve1.2 Taken as a
whole, these concepts and ideas come to operate as a sort of unstated
language that subtends the language of culture. Perhaps ironically, the
cultural unconscious provides much of the material that sustains and
1. Derrida, OfGrammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Johns
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1974, pp. 157-8.
2 The use of the notion of the unconscious to illuminate aspects of culture is
widespread in contemporary social theory: see, for example, James Donald (ed.),
Psychoanalysis and Cultural Theory: Thresholds, Macmillan, London, 1991 and
Slavoj Zizek, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan Through Popular
Culture, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1991.
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enlivens the language of culture - its metaphors, its figures of speech,
symbols and images. And thus these can be seen to have an underlying
or encrypted meaning. Given the means to bring this unconscious to
the surface, to decipher its meaning, we find that the unconscious
provides us with a deeper understanding of culture - and particularly
such artefacts as its religious doctrines and practices .. than does the
conscious.!
For the remainder of this paper, I would like to trace one further
'postmodern theme' that I believe is evident in esotericism. This is
because it provides postmodem thought with something it presently
lacks - and this I shall call a 'logic of the other', hoping that my use of
this expression will become clearer as I proceed. The expression has to
do with the way in which esotericism situates itself as a discourse, as a
text - and, by extension, how it situates the author or speaker of that
discourse, the esotericist himself or herself. My claim is that
esotericism is similar to postmodemism in that it situates itself as an
'other' to exoteric discourses. Esotericism is, like postmodemism, self-
avowedly analogical; the form which governs its discourses is held to
be in many ways distinct from the logos which governs the everyday
use of language. It is the analogical character of these discourses which
makes them so difficult to define. Faivre's claims as to the semantic
paucity of 'esotericism' can be matched by a plethora of similar claims
regarding 'postmodemism'. Theorists tend to fall back on notions of a
postmodem stance, approach, method, mode or form, rather than claim
any detenninacy for the term. One might almost speak of a
'postmodern way'.
Like postmodemism, esotericism has situated itself as somehow
marginal to received discourses, not merely in respect of what is said in
this field by also in respect of the way that language is used to say it.
Thus, as suggested above, the well-known esoteric themes of secrecy
and mystery, the idea that the truths thereby revealed are not for
everybody, that they are to be sought behind a veil of symbols 'and not
in their sublime nudity' to use Dionysius' expression. The prevalence
For the religious import of the cultural unconscious, see Julia Kristeva, In the
Beginning was Love: Psychoanalysis and Faith, trans. Arthur Goldhammer,
Columbia University Press, New York, 1987.
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of this theme in discussions of esotericism leads to its treatment as
definitional.
It is in part the historical marginality of esoteric discourses that
gives the study of esotericism a distinctly postmodem feel.
Postmodemism is preoccupied with marginalia; the recovery of
hitherto marginalised voices is among its most celebrated features.
This has been evidenced elsewhere in the study of religion by a
renewed fascination for mystic theology and for negative theology, the
relationship of which to the so-called philosophies of alterity (such as
those of Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas) is the subject of ongoing
speculation. 1 Across the human sciences, a concentration upon the
discourses, past and present, of those cultural elements formerly
marginalised - whether by social, sexual, racial or other cultural
detenninants - remains a primary motivating theme of postmodemism.
This explains the centrality to postmodemism of the notion of the
'other'. Its use derives from the writings of G.W.F. Hegel on social
history, from the attempt to explain how society develops the political
structures that it does. Hegel argued famously that, as history
progresses, there is a dialectical interplay of domination and
subordination, both real and symbolic. In Hegel's mythical rendering
of the moment of confrontation, the 'master' figure - representing both
dominant philosophy and its author(s) - secure the acquiescence of the
'slave' figure - the subordinate philosophy and its author(s). In so
doing, the slave renders itself - and its philosophy, such as it is - 'other'
to the cultural trends by which progress is to be charted. Its place in the
social framework is to be the underside of history, the fabric of history
but not its maker.2
Postmodem discourses have in a sense attempted to 'liberate' the
other from this subordination. Feminist, black and postcolonial
theorists in particular have sought to recognise the place of the other, to
assert its independent value and its contribution to history. To do so,
they have had to identify the logic that governs the history of the 'one',
There is a mountain of literature on this theme; see John D. Caputo, The Prayers
and Tears ofJacques Derrida: religion without religion, Indiana University
Press, Bloomington, 1997, for a fairly recent appraisal of argument.
2 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology olSpirit, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 1977, Part B, 1B, A.
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the logic that allows the one to designate itself and its story as the
universal and singular standard of progress. And concurrently, they
have had to outline the philosophies that distinguish the other from the
one, the patterns of difference of the other from the 'same'. They have
sought to uncover the 'hidden' histories, the stories of those not cited as
the bearers of progress, and show how these histories have contributed
to social development. And they have questioned whether progress
really can be conceived as such, where it cannot recognise the plurality
of agents upon which it actually depends.
Esotericism might similarly be described as an exemplary discourse
of the other. The focus on marginality, upon what is hidden within the
religious traditions, the idea of an underside of religious history which
is crucial to it but is largely unrecognised; all these place the study of
esotericism within the theoretical milieu of which postmodemism is
merely the popular form. In many ways esotericism is a more highly
sophisticated form of such discourses, largely because of the extreme
wealth of the tradition that it inherits. The self-conscious nature of
esotericism's marginality, its celebration of its discourses as secret and
hidden, means that its marginality has historically been seen as its very
basis, rather than as a hindrance.
Exploiting its marginal status, esotericism has developed a logic
which is distinctive. It is distinctive in that it positions its object of
study - the esoteric - at the heart of the cultural artefact to which it is
posited as marginal - the exoteric. Discourses of the marginal (such as
postmodem discourses) standardly figure the objects of their analysis at
the borders, the horizon, the extremity, the perceived limits of culture.
This is so, even where the marginality of the discourse is recognised as
a condition of its own possibility - that is, the discourse relies for its
existence upon its marginality - and where it is recognised that
existence of the marginal elements is a condition of possibility of the
culture as a whole - that is, the culture relies for its existence upon its
others. Esotericism, by contrast, places itself at the centre of the
religious traditions more broadly conceived; it is the veiled truth of
those religious discourses that circulate more widely. Esoteric study
takes us to the core spiritual traditions from which they emerge. The
value of esotericism is thus perceived to lie in its extreme interiority; it
illuminates the heart of culture.
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This question of where one situates the marginal discourse - and its
authors - is not merely a nominal one. It has implications for the status
that the marginal discourse holds within the symbolic systems of the
culture as a whole, and most particularly, of course, for its relation to
the exoteric discourses it supplements and supplements. For this
reason, I suggest that the study of esotericism - specifically, of the
attempts to define the esoteric in relation to the exoteric - might
profitably contribute to those other fields of postmodemism seeking to
construct a logic - or perhaps we might call it a geography - wherein
marginalised voices may be located. Postmodem theorists such as
Mark Taylor have named such discourses of marginality 'discourses of
alterity'; the expression has widespread use in referring to such
philosophies as those of Nietzsche and Soren Kierkegaard, as well as
their contemporary followers. l
I am arguing, then, that esotericism gives us a logic for placing
such discourses of alterity. It provides responses to the standard
postmodem questions: Is it possible to speak - and be heard - from the
position of other? How is the other to represent himself or herself? Is
it in the language of culture or by some other means? Is there a
knowledge that is proper to the other, by virtue of his or her position as
other?
3. The Logic of Marginal Discourses
I wish in this section to take feminist philosophy as an exemplary
discourse of postmodemism, and an exemplary discourse of alterity.
For feminist analyses of language provide one of the clearest avenues
of approach in contrasting different models of othemess. Feminist
theorists working in logic and epistemology have developed some of
the most sophisticated and targeted critiques of the received claims
See Mark C. Taylor, Erring: A Postmodern A/Theology, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1984, and Mark C. Taylor, Alterity, University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 1987, on this. See also Vincent Descombes, Modern French
Philosophy, trans. L. Scott-Fox and J. M. Harding, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1980, who argues that the question ofothemess remains the
motivating theme behind contemporary French philosophy, and so the work of
Derrida, Levinas, Foucault and Deleuze.
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across the humanities to universality. Feminist theorists of many
persuasions have been united by the claim that the alleged neutrality of
traditional disciplines can be asserted only refusing to acknowledge any
voice beyond that which is historically privileged - viz, that of white
Western man. These theorists have been joined by many more
contemporary voices in arguing for the singular nature of this
standpoint - and the existence of many others united by class, race and
many other historical contingencies.
Feminist concerns in this matter may be traced to Simone de
Beauvoir's well-known lament that 'humanity is male and man defines
woman not in herself but as relative to him; she is not regarded as an
autonomous being ... she is defined and differentiated with reference to
man and not he with reference to her ... He is the Subject, he is the
Absolute, she is the Other'.1 The category of man is hegemonic in that
it reserves for itself the ability to define itself and its values in the
singular, as the universal or neutral set of values operative across the
entire symbolic field.
In response to de Beauvoir's concern, a number of alternative
epistemologies have been proposed which attempt to situate plural
epistemic positions in relation to each other. The task that these
epistemologies set themselves is to model how plural discourses can
coexist within the same symbolic space. The model must recognise the
fact that some discourses will be subordinated to others on the scale of
received cultural values. And it must attempt to capture each in its
own, positive terms; it must resist the standard practice of defining
them only by reference to the one privileged standpoint. In other
words, it must avoid allowing. the dominant discourse hegemony over
the entire symbolic field.
Summarising feminist attempts at non-hegemonic epistemologies,
Val Plumwood has argued that there are three primary models of
othemess.2 Interestingly, de Beauvoir's discussion of the othemess of
woman appeals to all three of these models, assuming them to be
Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. H. M. Parshley, Penguin,
Harmondsworth, 1965, p. 8.
2 Val Plumwood, 'Centrism and the Logic of Alterity', in Marjorie Haas and
Rachel Joffe Falmagne (eds), Feminist Approaches to Logic, Rowman and
Littlefield, 2001.
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largely interchangeable. The frrst focuses on the negative attributions
implicit in the dichotomous structure of classical logics: woman,
according to this logic, is devalued because she is defined as not-man,
she lacks the qualities that are valorised as masculine. The second, by
contrast, focuses upon the relativity of such logics: woman, according
to this logic~ is devalued because she is defined relative to man, her
qualities are attributed solely by reference to those that are valorised as
masculine. The last, which Plumwood herself favours, focuses upon
the asymmetry of classical logics: woman, according to this logic, is
defined by reference to man but not man by reference to woman.
It is, says Plumwood, the asymmetrical nature of classical logic that
allows it to operate hegemonically. The difficulty with the first and
second of these models in explaining such hegemony, Plumwood
explains, is that they are both too encompassing and too restrictive. So
for example, the first model would problematise the use of any negative
attributions in characterising terms such as 'woman'. But what can be
wrong with characterising Jane as 'someone who would not let others
down' or, for that matter, as 'not the same as icecream', to use
Plumwood's examples. And so, because they encompass too many
perfectly good ways of characterising 'woman', they restrict what we
can say about 'woman' unnecessarily. The problem with the negative
attributions that traditionally attach to the category 'woman' is not
directly attributable to the fact that 'woman' is defined negatively, but
that it is defined asymmetrically with 'man'.
The second model is equally restrictive. It would problematise the
use to any attributions that were relative to another term. This would
help to explain what is wrong with attributions like 'Mrs John Doe',
where a woman is given no identity whatsoever except one that relates
her to her husband. The difficulty here, however, is that it is not so
much the relativity of the attribution that is the problem here, but the
fact that the relativity operates in one direction only. As de Beauvoir
notes, she is defined by reference to him and not he to her. If some
means of identifying both parties to a relationship could be constructed,
the both with reference to the other, then there might, in principle, be
nothing wrong with relative attributions. The problem, once again, is
the asymmetrical manner in which such relative attributions are
presently constructed: he attains an identity which attaches to him
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independently of his relationship with others; her identity is attained
only by reference to him.
Plumwood names the last of these three models the 'centrist'
model, in that it identifies the problem of classical dichotomy as lying
in its tendency to create a centre of value, a Archimidean point which is
the source of the good, the true, the light and so on. Its hegemony
arises from the fact that everything else, everything 'outside' this
centre, then takes on the values of 'other'. The definition of 'other'
commonly occurs in negative tenns, certainly; so too, the 'other' is
commonly defined in tenns relative to that centre. But the issue here -
the final cause of the disparity in power between one and other - lies in
the positing of a centre per se. It is the existence of the centre as source
of value that is the root cause of the asymmetrical valuation of one and
other, centre and margin.
It is, I believe, fair to say that most so-called postmodem theories -
feminist, black and postcolonial discourses most particularly - tend to
identify something like centrism as the problem with traditional logics.
This explains the very common tendency to revalorise marginality as a
locus of speech; the claim to be speaking 'from the margins' or 'from
the limit' is well-attested, marking one's discourse as countercultural in
some sense. 1 The metaphor of marginality is the most common one
used for mapping the relation of the one to its other. And indeed, this
model is extremely useful in that it accords the marginalised speaker
with a position of speech, ensuring that her speech will be heard and
valued (especially by other others) precisely because it is marginalised.
It is helpful in explaining why it is that the marginalised discourse is
difficult to assimilate into tradition: it follows rules that may not be
schematised according to the Classical logic of the tradition and may in
fact operate in conscious antithesis to such logic.
However, the centrist model will only take us so far. It can help to
represent the logic whereby the other is historically devalued, but it
does not provide any solution to this hegemony. Granted this is all it
For example, the claim to be writing from the margin or limit appears in the title
ofDrucilla Comell, The Philosophy ofthe Limit, Routledge, New York, 1992 and
Fred R. Dallmayr, Margins o/Political Discourse, SUNY Press, Albany, 1989.
The trend was very much strengthened by J. Derrida, Margins ofPhilosophy,
Harvester Press, Brighton, 1982.
14
Postmodernism and the Logic ofEsoteric Thought
claims to do. But it motivates the further question: what model should
replace it? How are we to remodel the relation of one to other? A great
deal of thought has recently been devoted to this question. Yet the
popularity of the notion of marginal discourses attests to the fact that
many theorists have found no other means of representing their
speaking position except by reference to those models that they claim to
refuse. Does one really wish to embrace marginality as a position of
speech? Is woman's voice truly peripheral? Is this the status feminism
wishes to claim for it? Are there no other alternatives in representing
one's position as other to those that are hegemonic within our culture?
For de Beauvoir, as for Hegel and for Jean-Paul Sartre before her,
there is ultimately no position of speech available to a speaker, beyond
those of hegemony and subordination.1 Within the existentialist
framework, the only authentic choice is that which asserts one's
independent authority, the choice to assert oneself as the one, the
absolute. To do otherwise represents weakness, a failure to rise above
the circumstances of one's given situation. It represents a refusal to
adopt the tenns of one's freedom to embrace the future and create one's
life autonomously, defining it by reference to one's own terms. There
are two choices: to adopt the voice of cultural authority (Sartre called
this the voice of 'transcendence') or remain mired in the lowliness of
ineffectualness (the voice of 'immanence'). Granted de Beauvoir's
developed this account to include a voice of oppression, but such a
voice remained submerged within the binary logic of hegemony/
subordination.
Contemporary discourses of alterity have tended, if not to overturn
the status accorded to these two voices, at least to emphasise the troth
of Hegel's admission in his discussion of the master/slave dialectic that
there is a certain (perhaps ironic) status in consciously occupying the
position of subordinate. For the subordinate retains a closeness to the
material reality of day-to-day existence that the dominant culture denies
itself by throwing its own interpretive overlay across the facts. This
A number ofde Beauvoir's commentators have noted that her position on this
point coincides with the existentialist account: see, for example, Catriona
MacKenzie, 'Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophy and/or the Female Body', in Carole
Pateman and Elizabeth Grosz (eds), Feminist Challenges: Social and Political
Theory, AlIen and Unwin, Sydney, 1986.
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status would of course be maximally exploited in Karl Marx's
revolutionary politic. As with Hegelian dialectics in general, the
problem here lies in avoiding a simple inversion of the binary logic,
thus leaving the master/slave or hegemony/subordinate structure intact.
The question that esotericism poses is whether the marginal
discourse must always be figured as subordinate for reason of its
marginality. Can a marginal discourse not figure itself at the centre of
culture and empower itself by virtue of this position? Historically,
esotericism has illustrated the fact that being marginal to tradition can
provide a worldview that is distinctive, original and authoritative in its
own terms. The study of esotericism may thus give contemporary
studies of the other an alternative model for representing the relation of
one to other within the Western symbolic.
4. The Logic of the Esoteric
One of the primary difficulties that theorists have faced in
characterising esotericism concerns how to characterise esotericism so
as to recognise the importance of its relation to tradition, but give it the
authority required to recognise it as an independent cultural force? The
tensions between these two ways of conceiving esotericism often
appear in discussions of its status and reflect the two competing ways
of defining it. .
Take for example an influential article "by Edward A. Tiryakian,
which tries to capture the sociological conditions underlying the rise of
interest in esotericism in the 1960s. Writing in a cultural milieu highly
attuned to reactive cultural trends, Tiryakian suggests that the rise of
interest in esotericism and occultism has a political motive: 'as a
spiritual reaction against the rationalistic-industrial-bureaucratic ethos
of modem society, it is part of the counterculture'.l Couching his
description in the Kuhnian notion of the cultural paradigm so popular in
the 1970s, Tiryakian defines culture as 'a collective paradigm which
provides the basic interpretations and justification of ongoing social
Edward A. Tiryakian, 'Toward the Sociology ofEsoteric Culture', American
Journalo/Sociology, Vol. 78, No. 3,1972, p. 496.
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existence'.1 Esoteric worldviews, then, coexist with the exoteric,
providing alternative 'cognitive mappings of nature and the cosmos, the
epistemological and ontological reflection ofultimate reality'.2
Tiryakian explains that the esotericists' knowledge is developed
internally to the individual, that as such it liberates him from the
strictures of everyday life: 'esoteric culture provides leverage against
the existing order by grounding political reflection and action in a
reality that transcends that of everyday life, but which is a reality that
may become actualised in the historical future by reversing the present
order of the world'.3 Tiryakian offers us little to explain how it is
precisely that the esoteric knowledge constitutes a countercultural
force, why and how it should arise as such and from whence its power
to provide 'leverage against the institutionalised paradigm' arises. But,
more importantly, while recognising that esotericism can act as a
vehicle for social change - it 'functions as a seat of inspiration to new
systems of social action'4 - Tiryakian nevertheless falls back upon the
account of esotericism as 'a marginal or underground movement'.5
Situating esotericism at the margins of culture rather undennines his
characterisation of it as a latent force operating at its heart.
The idea that esotericism acts as a reactionary force, operating
against the narrow-mindedness of the dominant cultural perspectives
(however these may be characterised), is attractive insofar as it allows
esotericism a certain cultural influence. Yet its deficiencies are those of
any theory that situates the other as a discursive paradigm at the
margins of culture. Wouter Hanegraaff has outlined the difficulties of
such a model as it appears in those writings of Frances Yates devoted to
tracing the existence of a covert hermetic tradition beneath the
developments of early modem scientific rationalism. The primary
difficulties that this model faces are two-fold: it gives the 'dominant
paradigm' the monopoly on intellectual progress, and attributes to
1 Ibid, p. 496.
2 Ibid, p. 499.
3 [bid, p. 506.
4 Ibid, p. 502.
5 Loc. cif.
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hermeticism an internal coherence and historical consistency in relation
to this tradition which it simply has not displayed. l
The problem here seems to be that esotericism is being defined
predominantly by reference to the exoteric, as counterculture. The
exoteric is accordingly being given a cultural centrality - and indeed
hegemony - which it does not have. The feminist analysis of models of
othemess above suggests that, as soon as the exoteric is accorded the
status of dominant paradigm within the cultural tradition, the
marginality of esotericism will correspondingly be understood in terms
of its subordination to that paradigm. And yet the example of
esotericism can be introduced precisely so as to provide a
counterexample to the apparent rule that all others must be figured upon
this model of hegemony/subordination. Esotericism is one discourse
that has apparently made its marginality work for it, providing it with a
locus from which to develop independently from the tradition, and from
that position of relative outsider to contribute to it and also on occasion
to challenge and to confront it.
Thus the esoteric could be seen as having an ambiguous status
within the history of religions: at once central to these traditions, in that
it illuminates them to the core, it nevertheless supplements them, in that
it is not merely a part of the tradition as one denomination among
others.2 So, for example, the various esoteric currents supervene upon
the several religious traditions of the West, having in some ways more
in common with each other than with the various religious traditions
from which they emerge. Indeed, more than ambiguity, esotericism
enjoys a certain paralogical status: the very conditions that make it
marginal are what contribute to its centrality - and vice versa. For
arguably, if esotericism had not kept itself at arm's length from the
theology of the religious traditions, it would not have been provided the
means to develop the depth of understanding of these traditions that it
has consistently displayed. And so also, if esotericism had not sought
A. Faivre and W. Hanegraaff (eds), Western Esotericism and the Science of
Religion, Peeters, Leuven, 1998, p. xiv.
2 The Derridean notion ofthe 'supplement' which is neither inside or outside that
which it supplements, but inhabits both spaces~ is an extremely apt one in
describing this ambiguous status: see J. Derrida, Dissemination, trans. Barbara
Johnson, Athlone Press, London, 1981.
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to reach so far beneath the surface of these traditions, then its extreme
sophistication and so too its exclusivity - the very things that make it
marginal - would not have been so pronounced.
The idea that there are discourses that have an ambiguous status
with regard to the discourses of our tradition is, of course, not
unprecedented. Esotericism is the one field within the intellectual
history of the West that has a sustained history that builds upon this
status. It is founded upon philosophies that themselves developed in
conscious engagement with the Platonic themes of our tradition. It is
perhaps the only marginal discourse in the West to have the breadth and
depth of history to challenge the Platonic dualisms upon which our
intellectual and religious traditions were founded. As such, it has
important contributions to make to contemporary discourses of alterity.
5. Figuring the other
There is an interesting issue regarding otherness that deserves mention
before closing, in part because it reinforces the alignments of
esotericism and postmodernism that I have drawn in this paper.
Beyond the question ofhow we are to situate the other in relation to the
one, lies a deeper and, I suspect, more difficult question of how the
other is to be figured in itself. What or who is the other? What or who
is it that this notion of 'other' ought to represent? Many contemporary
esotericists wish to leave aside the question of whether the voice that
they are seek to capture in their study of esotericism is that of man or
that of God - that is, whether this is an anthropology or a theology.
Pursuing a 'studies in religion' approach allows us to approach
esotericism as an anthropology, as a study of cultural representations of
God.1
Interestingly, a logically similar question has been addressed within
feminism - and the same answer embraced. In response to de
Beauvoir's discussion of woman's status, an argument erupted as to
whether feminism purported to represent women themselves - all
women, regardless of situation - or whether feminism addressed itself
Hanegraaff, among others, is clear on this point, describing the study of
esotericism from an etic perspective: see Faivre and Hanegraaff, Opt cit., p 12.
19
Esotericism and the Control ofKnowledge
to the cultural representations of 'woman'. Feminist scholars, like
religion scholars, have pursued the latter approach, leaving open the
question how far their discourses can truly claim to represent women
themselves. l
The questions facing esotericism and feminism are structurally
related: is it God itself that is the object of analysis or is it 'God', Le.,
the way in which our culture represents God? Again, is it women
themselves that are the object of analysis or is it 'woman', Le., the way
in which our culture represents women? Theorists have opted for the
latter response, but the former always lingers in the background and
asserts itself periodically as the issue of ultimate concern. For why
bother with the cultural representations of God or woman if not to
understand something about God or women themselves? Why
challenge cultural representations of God or woman if not the better to
represent God or women themselves? Are these not the ultimate object
of their analysis? It seems to me that, like other discourses of alterity,
esotericism and feminism are plagued by such questions, even as they
try to position themselves as meta-discourses, as second-order analyses
of culture, first and foremost.
There is, at this point, an equivalence between these two discourses
of alterity which deserves further analysis on the part of feminist
theologians. To date, I have suggested that the reason why esotericism
stands as a clear exemplar of discourses of alterity is because of the
way that it is situated relative to the exoteric traditions. It is this, I have
suggested, that gives them the character of secrecy and mystery. But
there is a further reason: there is a second-order 'otherness' at work
here. This further level of othemess pertains to the ultimate object of
analysis in the study of esotericism: God. Esotericism stands as an
exemplar of the discourses of alterity because historically, esotericism
shares with negative theology a positing of God as other. God is
conceived as other to man, and hence other to man's discourses, to the
symbolic systems which man creates to represent his universe. It is this
that lends the discourses of esotericism their own marginal status; they
speak of that which pertains to God, and not to man. There is food for
See Diana Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature and Difference,
Routledge, New York, 1989 for a clear summary of arguments on this contentious
issue.
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thought here: does God stand on the same ground as woman in this
respect - in respect of their othemess to the discourses of man?
I shall leave the discussion of alterity at this rather provocative
question, noting merely that feminism and esotericism, while they may
appear to be culturally diverse on the face of it, nevertheless have quite
a good deal to contribute to each other. Indeed, it is highly worthwhile
to treat esotericism, not as some arcane field within history, but as an
exemplary contemporary field of study, and thus aligned not merely
temporally but also thematically to other contemporary fields within the
humanities. Of late, mysticism and negative theology have been
receiving a good deal of attention from theorists of a roughly
postmodem bent; esotericism will no doubt come under similar scrutiny
before long. There is no doubt too that postmodemism can only benefit
from such a study.
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